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device. It is well-documented that this rule significantly impacts our legal
system. As a result, the need for its effective utilization has been apparent
since its introduction. Despite this, federal courts have inconsistently
applied the rule during their analyses of overbroad class definitions at the
class certification stage. Consequently, parties involved in such litigation
have been exposed to unnecessary costs and the potential for forum
shopping.
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INTRODUCTION
On April 20, 2010, the Deepwater Horizon oil rig exploded in the Gulf of
Mexico.1 This catastrophe caused deaths, injuries, and a massive discharge
of oil into the Gulf Coast.2 BP, which leased the oil rig at the time, faced
potential legal claims from numerous victims who were desperate for
immediate relief.3 Facing such obvious and dramatic harm, the victims could
1. See In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 795–96 (5th Cir. 2014).
2. See id.
3. See, e.g., Rachel Guillory, Remembering the Victims and Survivors of Deepwater
Horizon, OCEAN CONSERVANCY (Oct. 1, 2016), https://oceanconservancy.org/blog/2016/10/
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have filed a motion in federal court to certify a class action suit against BP
for the company’s negligence with regard to this incident.4
However, had they done so, a district court may have then denied their
motion on the grounds that the proposed class definition included a
substantial number of individuals without legitimate causes of action.5
Specifically, a court may have felt that sufficient commonalities did not exist
among the class members or that it could not identify the injured class
members from the class definition.6 Nevertheless, the plaintiffs would have
been able to successfully appeal the decision if this district court had
demonstrated imprecise analysis in its decision.
Ultimately, if many illegitimate claimants were indeed included in the
class definition, a district court’s denial of class certification may very well
have been the just result. The victims would have been able to bring
individual claims against BP and the courts would have been better able to
deal with their individualized suits.7 Still, if the district court had erred in
this analysis, the plaintiffs would have been extensively delayed in obtaining
their relief if they decided to appeal the decision.8 Under this scenario, such
an unnecessary delay would have been avoided if the district court had
initially applied appropriate scrutiny.
While courts must make correct decisions, this example illustrates the need
for courts to, at least, make consistent decisions if legal disputes are to be
effectively managed.9 Justice John Marshall Harlan, for one, particularly
commanded that the implementation of a clear set of rules enables individuals
to “settle their differences in an orderly, predictable manner.”10 He added
that “social organization and cohesion” are unattainable without such a
system.11 Hence, as he framed it, the key to a legal system’s effectiveness is
the uniform application of its rules.12 Consequently, the 1938 enactment of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) and their subsequent adoption

01/remembering-the-victims-and-survivors-of-deepwater-horizon/ [https://perma.cc/2RYDKAFM].
4. The following hypothetical is based on procedural events that occurred in Byrd v.
Aaron’s, Inc., No. 11-101, 2017 WL 4326106 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2017), adopted by 2017 WL
4269715 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 26, 2017).
5. Motions for class certification will be denied where proposed class definitions include
a substantial number of uninjured members. See infra text accompanying notes 202–09.
6. See, for example, infra Part II.A.1.a for an analogous instance of improper class
certification analysis.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 205–08.
8. See generally Edward F. Sherman, Class Actions and Duplicative Litigation, 62 IND.
L.J. 507, 511 (1987).
9. See generally Aleardo Zanghellini, The Foundations of the Rule of Law, 28 YALE J.L.
& HUMAN. 213 (2016).
10. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971).
11. Id.
12. See Stephen N. Subrin, Uniformity in Procedural Rules and the Attributes of a Sound
Procedural System: The Case for Presumptive Limits, 49 ALA. L. REV. 79, 86–87 (1997).
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demonstrates our society’s enthusiasm for this societal model of consistent
and uniform application of rules.13
Rule 23’s class certification requirements, as alluded to above, encapsulate
the importance of consistently applied FRCP.14 Specifically, the Rule is
home to a powerful procedural tool known as the class action.15 As
evidenced, the class action device serves as a method of representative
litigation that enables people to join together to adjudicate their similar
claims.16 In turn, this consolidation promotes efficiency by preserving scarce
judicial resources and fairness by ensuring consistent legal determinations.17
However, such efficient and fair outcomes only result where class members
sufficiently share common interests.18 The Rule calls this requirement
“predominance.”19 Likewise, class definitions must refer to objective criteria
for parties to discern who will be bound by the potential judgments.20 Courts
have called this requirement “ascertainability.”21 The consistent application
of the Rule’s predominance and ascertainability requirements helps ensure
its effectiveness.22
Alarmingly, despite the Rule’s seeming clarity, courts have not uniformly
utilized these requirements during analysis of overbroad class definitions,
which has become a major roadblock for plaintiffs seeking class
certification.23 Overbroad class definitions contain too many individuals
with illegitimate claims for liability.24 While courts consistently deny
certification where substantial overbreadth exists, some do so by way of
predominance analysis25 while others do so through an analysis of
13. See Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Establish Uniformity, FED. JUD. CTR.,
https://www.fjc.gov/history/timeline/federal-rules-civil-procedure-establish-uniformity
[https://perma.cc/TXA5-6SNZ] (last visited Aug. 24, 2018).
14. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
15. 1 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 1:1 (5th ed. 2011). This
Note will focus on Rule 23(b)(3) plaintiff class actions.
16. See Daniel Luks, Note, Ascertainability in the Third Circuit: Name That Class
Member, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2359, 2362 (2014).
17. See generally id.
18. See generally Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013).
19. See 2 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 15, § 4:47; Myriam Gilles, Note, Class Dismissed:
Contemporary Judicial Hostility to Small-Claims Consumer Class Actions, 59 DEPAUL L.
REV. 305, 311 (2010).
20. See 1 JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN, MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4:2 (14th ed.
2017).
21. See Gilles, supra note 19, at 312.
22. See supra text accompanying notes 18–19.
23. Compare In re Petrobras Sec., 862 F.3d 250, 257 (2d Cir. 2017), Webb v. Exxon
Mobil Corp., 856 F.3d 1150, 1155 (8th Cir. 2017) (analyzing overbreadth under the
predominance requirement), and Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 666 F.3d 581, 588 (9th Cir.
2012), with Brecher v. Argentina, 806 F.3d 22, 24–25 (2d Cir. 2015) (analyzing overbreadth
under the ascertainability requirement), EQT Prod. Co. v. Adair, 764 F.3d 347, 359 (4th Cir.
2014), and Walewski v. ZeniMax Media, Inc., 502 F. App’x 857, 861 (11th Cir. 2012).
24. See Geoffrey C. Shaw, Note, Class Ascertainability, 124 YALE L.J. 2354, 2383 (2015).
Here, “illegitimate” means claimants with no injury and claimants that, while otherwise
injured, do not have an injury contemplated by the scope of the proposed class definition.
25. See, e.g., Mazza, 666 F.3d at 596; see also Circle Click Media LLC v. Regus Mgmt.
Grp. LLC, No. 3:12-CV-04000-SC, 2015 WL 6638929, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2015).
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ascertainability.26 Irrespective of how this distinction may impact the
substantive elements of class certification, the mere existence of
inconsistency causes confusion for litigants.27 Moreover, this same
confusion results in unnecessary litigation costs and the potential for forum
shopping.28 Rule 23’s significant impact on our legal system29 and on the
economy exacerbates such concerns.30 Accordingly, this Note details a
sparsely acknowledged judicial inconsistency issue that must be fixed to
promote Rule 23’s effectiveness.
Part I of this Note illustrates the background of the FRCP to show why
their effectiveness depends on their consistent application. This Part then
focuses on Rule 23 and the associated overbreadth issue to demonstrate how
inconsistent analysis creates the potential for litigant uncertainty. Part II
presents conflicting cases to show why overbreadth may be analyzed under
either the predominance or ascertainability requirement. In doing so, Part II
details the litigation issues that arise from this divergence and explains how
exactly this ensuing inconsistency inevitably produces detrimental
consequences for litigants. Finally, Part III explains that overbreadth should
be consistently analyzed under the Rule’s predominance requirement to
promote analytic clarity.
I. RULE 23 AND THE NEED FOR JUDICIAL CONSISTENCY
The depths of this procedural landscape must be dissected to comprehend
the importance of this analytic clarity issue. Part I.A describes the
background of the FRCP and the general need for uniformity in civil
procedure to contextualize the concerns associated with inconsistent
overbreadth analysis. Next, Part I.B provides necessary context regarding
Rule 23 and its class certification requirements. Finally, Part I.C discusses
why and how the overbreadth issue presents problems at the class
certification stage.
A. The FRCP Need to Be Consistently Applied
The FRCP, like any set of procedural rules, must be consistently applied
in the courts for each rule to be effective.31 This is because procedural rules
aim to ensure predictable process32 and certainty for litigants.33 Hence,
consistently applied procedural rules enable litigants to efficiently structure
26. See, e.g., Carter v. PJS of Parma, Inc., No. 1:15 CV 1545, 2016 WL 3387597, at *2
(N.D. Ohio June 20, 2016); see also Diacakis v. Comcast Corp., No. C 11-3002 SBA, 2013
WL 1878921, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 2013).
27. See Shaw, supra note 24, at 2385.
28. See infra Part II.
29. See 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 15, § 1:16.
30. See id. § 1:17.
31. See supra text accompanying note 12.
32. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky & Barry Friedman, The Fragmentation of Federal
Rules, 46 MERCER L. REV. 757, 780 (1995).
33. See Robin J. Effron, Reason Giving and Rule Making in Procedural Law, 65 ALA. L.
REV. 683, 693 (2014).
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their expectations of how courts will treat subsequent proceedings.34 As a
result, parties ideally do not need to learn multiple interpretations of the same
rule.35 This allows parties to save time, money, and effort.36 Conversely,
litigation costs can vary drastically where courts’ applications of procedural
rules diverge.37 This can happen when a court indicates that a party
incorrectly interpreted a procedural rule due to the party’s reliance on
inconsistent precedent38—for example, if the court has applied inconsistent
overbreadth analysis during class certification.39
Likewise, consistently applied FRCP promote fairness by encouraging
resolutions based solely upon the merits of claims.40 Thus, when uniformly
applied, the FRCP place desirable limits on forum shopping, which is the
practice of seeking a litigation advantage by choosing a particular forum over
another.41 Forum shopping exposes similarly situated parties to varying
litigation opportunities solely because of how the different jurisdictions or
judges interpret their respective or common procedural rules.42 This limits
parties’ opportunities to construct the same claims and defenses.43 Of course,
litigants should not be subjected to such arbitrary idiosyncrasies.44 Simply,
this phenomenon is detested because of a ubiquitous “inchoate sense” against
litigation results and costs that turn solely on the choice of forum.45
Unsurprisingly, before the adoption of the FRCP, nonuniform procedural
rules produced many problems for litigants.46 In particular, efficiency and
fairness issues ensued as the federal courts adhered to the procedural rules of
their respective states.47 This nonconformity wasted litigants’ resources and
fortified an unjustifiably complicated system of rules.48 Lawyers who
represented multistate corporations, for example, had difficulties practicing
law due to persistent procedural inconsistencies.49 Predictably, this discord
34. See id. at 691.
35. See id. at 702.
36. See id.
37. For a discussion on whether state courts should follow the FRCP, see generally
Thomas O. Main, Procedural Uniformity and the Exaggerated Role of Rules: A Survey of
Intra-State Uniformity in Three States That Have Not Adopted the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 46 VILL. L. REV. 311 (2001).
38. See Meinders v. Emery Wilson Corp., No. 14-CV-596-SMY-SCW, 2016 WL
3402621, at *4 n.4 (S.D. Ill. June 21, 2016) (discussing how the defendant incorrectly
analyzed the predominance and ascertainability requirements).
39. See id.
40. See Chemerinsky & Friedman, supra note 32, at 781.
41. See id. at 782.
42. See Markus Petsche, What’s Wrong with Forum Shopping? An Attempt to Identify
and Assess the Real Issues of a Controversial Practice, 45 INT’L LAW. 1005, 1027 (2011).
43. See Effron, supra note 33, at 693.
44. See id. at 691.
45. See Shrey Sharma, Note, Do the Second Circuit’s Legal Standards on Class
Certification Incentivize Forum Shopping?: A Comparative Analysis of the Second Circuit’s
Class Certification Jurisprudence, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 877, 884 (2016).
46. See Subrin, supra note 12, at 100.
47. See Chemerinsky & Friedman, supra note 32, at 780.
48. Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity,
Divergence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2002 (1989).
49. See id.
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led to the early twentieth-century enactment of the uniform system of
procedural rules that govern civil proceedings in United States federal courts:
the FRCP.50
Today, the FRCP aim for “the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination
of every action.”51 Certainly, the importance of predicable application is
heightened in the context of Rule 23.52 Like other claim-determinative
devices, the Rule’s consistent application safeguards litigants’ capacities to
assert their claims and defenses.53 Thus, risks of litigant confusion,
unnecessary litigation costs, and the potential for forum shopping remain
heightened when courts inconsistently apply the Rule’s class certification
requirements.54 As referenced, these risks also mirror those that existed
before the enactment of the FRCP.55 The next section describes how Rule
23’s impressive impact has intensified this need for judicial consistency.
B. The Background of Rule 23
Rule 23 exemplifies prototypical representative litigation:56 the device
ensures that sizable groups of people with common interests may enforce
their legal rights.57 The Rule consolidates claims so that class representatives
litigate on behalf of absent members.58 In turn, the parties, including the
absent class members, are bound by the litigation.59 The device’s lure is
evident as it prevents multiplicative actions that may result in inconsistent
dispositions.60
However, the Rule does produce risks via its mode of vicarious
representation.61 Absent members, for example, may be inadequately
represented where too many dissimilarities exist among proposed classes.62
Equally troublesome is the potential for defendants to be adversely bound to
claimants with feeble actions.63 Therefore, Rule 23 can operate as an
exception to the “maxim” of personal litigation only by virtue of its

50. See Subrin, supra note 12, at 80.
51. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
52. See Effron, supra note 33, at 693.
53. See id. A claim-determinative rule either allows or disallows claims to move forward.
Thus, the denial of class certification may be the “death knell” for plaintiffs’ claims. See Erin
L. Geller, Note, The Fail-Safe Class as an Independent Bar to Class Certification, 81
FORDHAM L. REV. 2769, 2773 (2013). For defendants, the grant of class certification may
produce pressure to “settle nonmeritorious claims” to evade the potential for transactional
costs. See id.
54. See supra text accompanying notes 27–28.
55. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (discussing the litigation problems that led
to the creation of the FRCP).
56. See 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 15, § 1:1.
57. See Luks, supra note 16, at 2362.
58. See 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 15, § 1:1.
59. See id.
60. See id. § 1:15.
61. See id. § 1:1; infra text accompanying notes 139–42.
62. See 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 15, § 1:1.
63. See supra text accompanying note 53; infra Part I.C.
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procedural safeguards.64 Accordingly, the Rule’s requirements compel
consistency65 to ensure its effectiveness—a point underscored by the drafters
of the 1966 amendment.66
Rule 23’s impressive impact on the courts67 and on the economy68 further
highlights the importance of consistency. To elucidate this point, consider
that class actions compose a significant portion of annual federal court
filings,69 that the device enables thousands of claims per year,70 and that Rule
23 actions sweep across an array of subject matters.71 Moreover, these
claims may take years to complete72 and involve numerous hours of motion
practice and brief writing.73 Thus, even though the number of certified class
actions remains small due to the Rule’s associated risks, Rule 23 suits result
in billions of dollars being redistributed annually within the American
economy.74
Indeed, large financial settlements and judgments have led to
extraordinary transaction costs for litigants as well.75 Plaintiffs’ attorneys,
for example, are usually paid on contingencies that may reach 25 to 35
percent of a class action’s gross recovery.76 This makes their time quite
valuable.77 And defendants’ lawyers, who often represent corporations, may
bill thousands of dollars per hour working on Rule 23 matters.78 Thus, a Rule
64. See 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 15, § 1:1.
65. See supra text accompanying notes 61–64.
66. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment (explaining how
the Rule previously did not “provide an adequate guide to the proper extent of judgments”).
67. See Erin Coe, Federal Courts See Huge Rise in Class Actions, LAW360 (Apr. 16, 2008,
12:00 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/53273 [https://perma.cc/467T-HLEL].
68. See 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 15, § 1:17.
69. See id. § 1:18.
70. See Coe, supra note 67.
71. See 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 15, § 1:18; see also Brian Fitzpatrick, An Empirical
Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee Awards, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 811,
818 (2010) (explaining that Rule 23 actions involve claims ranging from securities fraud to
civil rights).
72. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 71, at 820.
73. See, e.g., Jason Grant, Judge Slashes Fees, Offers Primer on Billing, in Cookbook
Case, N.Y.L.J. (Sept. 12, 2017, 4:02 PM), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/
id=1202797828979/Judge-Slashes-Fees-Offers-Primer-on-Billing-in-Cookbook-Case
[https://perma.cc/MK7D-TPP8]; Will You Take My Case for a Flat Fee?, LAW OFFICES JOHN
L. DODD & ASSOCIATES, http://www.appellate-law.com/Questions/FlatContinFee.htm
[https://perma.cc/4L9M-3N6N] (last visited Aug. 24, 2018) (noting how an appeal may take
over 120 billable hours to complete).
74. See 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 15, § 1:17 (noting that in recent years class action
recovery has totaled over $33 billion, much of which was through settlements).
75. See id. § 1:18; Fitzpatrick, supra note 71, at 814 (demonstrating that such plaintiffs’
attorneys annually received $5 billion from 2006 through 2009); Coe, supra note 67 (noting
how corporate law firm partners may bill over $1000 per hour); Doug Greene, The Root Cause
of Skyrocketing Class Action Defense Costs, LANE POWELL (Sept. 9, 2014),
http://www.dandodiscourse.com/2014/09/09/the-root-cause-of-skyrocketing-securities-classaction-defense-costs/ [https://perma.cc/555Y-MADS] (noting how a corporate defense law
firm could collect over $20 million in fees during a Rule 23 action).
76. See 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 15, § 1:18.
77. See id.
78. See, e.g., Greene, supra note 75.
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23 suit may be simultaneously quite lucrative or expensive depending on the
party.79 Naturally, however, these costs dramatically increase when judicial
inconsistencies cause litigant uncertainty.80
The Rule’s significant impact has even led the U.S. Supreme Court to
strive for increased analytic clarity.81 Nevertheless, such uniformity has been
elusive when courts have analyzed overbreadth at the class certification
stage.82 So, Rule 23’s class certification requirements must be broken down
individually to better gauge this issue and to further comprehend how much
confusion arises.
1. The Rule 23 Class Certification Requirements
The existence of broad judicial discretion at the class certification stage
furthers the risk of inconsistent analysis.83 And yet, such discretion is
necessary due to Rule 23’s broad scope.84 As a result, it is vital to fully
understand the class certification requirements85 to determine how such
discretion may be properly exercised.86
For courts to grant class certification, plaintiffs must satisfy all relevant
Rule 23 requirements.87 The first hurdle is Rule 23(a).88 Specifically, Rule
23(a) requires (1) numerosity, (2) commonality, (3) typicality, and
(4) adequacy.89 Once the plaintiff class meets the Rule 23(a) requirements,
it must then fit into one of Rule 23(b)’s three subcategories.90
Certainly, the class action best serves its intended function when the
consolidated claims would otherwise have been too numerous to be
individually litigated or joined together.91 Thus, Rule 23(a)(1) mandates a
sufficiently numerous class.92 The requirement, however, does not provide
a clear formula or “magic number.”93 Nonetheless, proposed classes of fewer
than twenty members ordinarily do not satisfy Rule 23(a)(1).94
Like Rule 23(a)(1), the Rule 23(a)(2) commonality requirement focuses
on ensuring the protection of absent class members.95 Rule 23(a)(2) requires

79. See supra text accompanying note 78.
80. See supra text accompanying note 34.
81. See generally Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
82. See infra Part I.C.
83. See generally Tobias Barrington Wolff, Discretion in Class Certification, 162 U. PA.
L. REV. 1897 (2014).
84. See id. at 1947.
85. See Luks, supra note 16, at 2394.
86. See Wolff, supra note 83, at 1897.
87. See 3 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 15, § 7:1.
88. See Luks, supra note 16, at 2366.
89. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
90. See Luks, supra note 16, at 2366.
91. See 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 15, § 1:2.
92. See Luks, supra note 16, at 2366.
93. See Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 591 (3d Cir. 2012);
1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 15, § 3:11.
94. See 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 15, § 3:11.
95. See id. § 1:2.
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that a common question of law or fact exist among the class.96 Hence,
analysis of this requirement demands quantitative assessments of common
versus individualized questions.97 Justice Antonin Scalia excogitated this
point in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes.98 To satisfy Rule 23(a)(2), he noted,
claims “must depend upon a common contention of such a nature that it is
capable of class wide resolution.”99 Thus, the commonality requirement is
rarely contentious.100
Alternatively, the final two requirements under Rule 23(a)—typicality and
adequacy—address essential qualifications for class representatives.101 To
satisfy Rule 23(a)(3), a representative’s claims and defenses must be typical
of those of the class.102 This is needed so that the representative’s interests
align with the interests of those who he or she aims to litigate on behalf of.103
Similarly, Rule 23(a)(4) requires that a class representative adequately
represents the interests of his or her class.104 This adequacy requirement
legitimatizes Rule 23’s binding effect in the absence of class members
litigating individually.105 Here, class representatives are mandated to pursue
the class’s interests.106
As stated, classes must fit into one of Rule 23(b)’s three subcategories once
the Rule 23(a) prerequisites are satisfied.107 Rule 23(b)(1), an infrequently
invoked provision, deems classes appropriate where separate actions would
likely produce inconsistent adjudications.108 In turn, Rule 23(b)(2) creates a
remedy in the form of injunctive relief.109 Rule 23(b)(2) classes may be
certified where “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on
grounds that apply generally to the class.”110 Notably, due to these
distinctive characteristics, Rule 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2) actions contain
mandatory classes111 that absent members may not opt out of.112
Alternatively, Rule 23(b)(3) actions are not mandatory and potential
claimants may opt out.113 This distinction in opt-out rights exists because
individualized monetary relief—the remedy offered by Rule 23(b)(3)—

96. See id. § 3:18.
97. See 6 THOMAS SMITH & ELIZABETH WILLIAMS, CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE
§ 23:17 (3d ed. 2015).
98. 564 U.S. 338, 342 (2011).
99. See id. at 338, 350.
100. See 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 15, § 3:18.
101. See id. § 1:2.
102. See id. § 3:28.
103. See id.
104. See id. § 3:18.
105. See id. § 3:50.
106. See id.
107. See id. § 1.3.
108. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1). This Note does not focus on Rule 23(b)(1).
109. See Luks, supra note 16, at 2367.
110. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).
111. See 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 15, § 1:3.
112. See id.
113. See id.
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produces the potential for claimants to be unjustly forced into such
litigation.114
Alas, the need for an opt-out provision is just one example of the unique
concerns associated with Rule 23(b)(3)’s remedy.115 The overbreadth issue
represents another.116 Generally, this issue does not relate to Rule 23(b)(2)
suits because the existence of uninjured claimants is largely irrelevant where
class-wide injunctive relief is sought.117 Only in Rule 23(b)(3) actions,
where heightened class cohesion is required for certification, does the
overbreadth problem truly manifest.118 These concerns with respect to class
cohesion for Rule 23(b)(3) class certification led to the addition of
supplementary procedural protections119 in the form of predominance and
ascertainability.120 Oddly, though, the predominance and ascertainability
requirements often remain intertwined.121
2. The Predominance Requirement
Understanding the predominance requirement is essential to
comprehending the problems associated with its inconsistent application
during overbreadth analysis. To satisfy Rule 23(b)(3), common questions of
law or fact must predominate over individualized inquiries such that the class
action is superior to separate actions.122 Thus, this predominance
requirement demands qualitative analysis.123 Common issues must not
merely exist in a Rule 23(b)(3) class as is required by Rule 23(a)(2).124
Rather, common issues must outweigh individualized issues.125
Consequently, the commonality and predominance requirements may be
analyzed congruently.126
The hallmark of this predominance question is whether a common form of
liability exists among the proposed class members.127 Indeed, the
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. See 1 MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 20, § 4:2.
117. See generally Catherine M. Chiccine, Ascertainability Not Required in 23(b)(2) Class
Action, Says Court, A.B.A. (Jan. 20, 2017), https://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/
litigationnews/top_stories/012017-ascertainability-class-action.html [https://perma.cc/AR28HYWY].
118. See Andrew Trask, Countering Injunctive-Relief Classes: The Cohesiveness
Requirement, MCGUIREWOODS (Apr. 6, 2010), http://www.classactioncountermeasures.com/
2010/04/articles/certification/countering-injunctive-relief-classes-the-cohesivenessrequirement/ [https://perma.cc/V8QM-AEAX].
119. See Geller, supra note 53, at 2774–75.
120. See id.
121. See supra text accompanying note 23.
122. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 607 n.10
(1997).
123. See 6 SMITH & WILLIAMS, supra note 97, § 23:17.
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1439 (2013) (noting that a common
form of liability “generally” satisfies the predominance requirement).
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requirement may be satisfied even where individualized damage calculations
are necessary.128 But no exact equation exists.129 So, while some courts
have held that damage variances may predominate over common liability
issues,130 others have held that variations in applicable law may outweigh
relevant commonalities.131
To ease such tension, courts have applied a two-step predominance test.132
First, the “characterization” step distinguishes common questions from
individualized questions133 by sorting the issues that are “susceptible to
class-wide proof.”134 Second, these courts then loosely compare the relevant
evidence to determine which issues predominate.135 However, this test
remains imperfect as it is conducted by judges exercising their own
discretion.136 And, as alluded to, because judges utilize discretion when
analyzing class certification, fewer factors to analyze may actually produce
more consistent results.137
In sum, predominant common issues effectively establish a class-wide
right to recovery.138 Take, for example, two potential suits brought by the
female employees of a retail store.139 These suits generally allege that the
employer paid its male employees more than its female employees in similar
positions. Suit one involves a proposed Rule 23(b)(3) class140 in which the
female employees seek damages from the employer to remedy their salary
disparity. Suit two involves a proposed Rule 23(b)(2) class141 that seeks
injunctive relief to halt the employer’s discriminatory practices.
In suit one, the class members must be similarly situated for the
consolidation of their claims to be effective.142 Otherwise, many class
members may be granted unwarranted damages.143 This occurrence would
also potentially subject the defendant to unjust liability.144 However, in suit
two, major dissimilarities between the class members could prove
irrelevant.145 Here, due to the absence of individualized relief, a class-wide

128. See id.
129. See 6 SMITH & WILLIAMS, supra note 97, § 23:17.
130. See, e.g., Ibe v. Jones, 836 F.3d 516, 521 (5th Cir. 2016); Corder v. Ford Motor Co.,
283 F.R.D. 337, 342 (W.D. Ky. 2012).
131. See Johnson v. Nextel Commc’ns Inc., 780 F.3d 128, 140 (2d Cir. 2015).
132. See, e.g., Wilkins v. Just Energy Grp., 308 F.R.D. 170, 185 (N.D. Ill. 2015).
133. See 2 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 15, § 4:50.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See generally Wolff, supra note 83, at 1940.
137. See id. at 1897, 1940.
138. See Morangelli v. Chemed Corp., 275 F.R.D. 99, 105 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).
139. This hypothetical is based on the facts from Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S.
348 (2011).
140. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
141. See id. r. 23(b)(2).
142. See supra text accompanying note 122.
143. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 564 U.S. at 351.
144. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment.
145. See supra text accompanying note 117.
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injunction with respect to the employer’s discrimination would likely not
induce injustice.146
Accordingly, common questions must predominate in Rule 23(b)(3)
classes to ensure the existence of similarly situated members.147 The mere
existence of a common fact, like employment at the same retail store, is
insufficient to cure these associated risks.148 Nevertheless, the satisfaction
of the predominance requirement is useless where class members remain
unascertainable.149 Litigants must be able to identify the claimants from the
class definition with certainty.150 Precise class definitions based on reference
to objective criteria bridge the gap between cohesive classes in theory and
cohesive classes in reality.151
3. The Ascertainability Requirement
The ascertainability requirement is the leading alternative to predominance
for framing overbreadth analysis at the Rule 23(b)(3) class certification
stage.152 However, ascertainability is not explicitly within Rule 23’s class
certification requirements.153 Instead, it developed from the needs of both
courts and litigants.154 As for courts, they particularly require plaintiffs to
satisfy the ascertainability requirement to secure their ability to identify the
potential class members.155 Naturally, courts only grant certification for
objectively workable classes.156
For claimants, a need for the ascertainability requirement flowed from
abovementioned opt-out provision.157 Judge Richard Posner explained that
the reason “for allowing opting out in [23(b)(3)] class action[s] is that even
though one class member’s claim may overlap [with] another’s (common
issues), it may be different in respects that makes [class members] want to
bring [their] own suit.”158 As a result, class members who do not opt out of
146. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).
147. See supra text accompanying note 122.
148. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment. These
risks include the potential for unwarranted relief and finality concerns. See supra text
accompanying notes 143–45.
149. See Geller, supra note 53, at 2775.
150. See 1 MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 20, § 3:2.
151. See id.
152. See Shaw, supra note 24, at 2384.
153. See Little v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 691 F.3d 1302, 1304 (11th Cir. 2012); Marcus v.
BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 592 (3d Cir. 2012); Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co.,
666 F.3d 581, 596 (9th Cir. 2012); Romberio v. UnumProvident Corp., 385 F. App’x 423, 431
(6th Cir. 2009). The linguistic construction of the ascertainability requirement varies due to
its implicit nature. See Luks, supra note 16, at 2372. Nevertheless, courts find the meaning of
the requirement is the same. See FED. PRACTICE MANUAL FOR LEGAL AID ATT’YS § 7.2 (Jeffrey
S. Gutman et al. eds., 2017), http://www.federalpracticemanual.org/chapter7/section2
[https://perma.cc/TZ5A-MBGM].
154. See Gilles, supra note 19, at 311.
155. See Geller, supra note 53, at 2775.
156. See In re Nexium Antitrust Litig., 777 F.3d 9, 21–22 (1st Cir. 2015); Chiang v.
Veneman, 385 F.3d 256, 271 (3d Cir. 2004).
157. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B).
158. Berger v. Xerox Corp., 338 F.3d 755, 764 (7th Cir. 2003).
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the litigation are bound by its proceedings.159 However, these individuals
are not bound when inadequately notified.160
Of course, adequate notice is impossible where a claimant is unsure
whether he or she is included in a class definition.161 Consequently, class
representatives need to be able to identify the class members from the
proposed class definition with certainty.162 Ideally, the ascertainability
requirement alleviates the risk that claimants will be unknowingly forced into
litigation.163
Likewise, this requirement protects defendants.164 For them, unclear class
definitions generate concerns of finality as claimants may be subsequently
released from the results of the litigation165 and therefore free to bring similar
individual actions.166 This potential for inconsistent liability contravenes
Rule 23’s purpose.167 Accordingly, Rule 23(b)(3) class certification
fundamentally requires the satisfaction of the ascertainability requirement.
Rule 23’s advisory committee168 even consented to this implicit
requirement.169 Courts have also widely demonstrated their approval since
the requirement’s introduction.170 But, there is no “universally agreed upon”
documented source for its authority.171 While some find ascertainability to
be implicit within Rule 23(a),172 others find authority for this requirement in
Rule 23(c)(1)(b)’s demand for classes to be sufficiently defined.173
Unsurprisingly, this incongruence has produced a controversial circuit
split.174

159. See, e.g., id. at 763.
160. See id.
161. See id. at 764. Where a class definition is so subjective or amorphous, for example,
an individual may not have the ability to sufficiently determine whether he or she is a
legitimate class member. Obviously, a potential class member is not provided with adequate
notice in such instances because it is impossible for him or her to fully analyze the legal
ramifications of the suit (including the ability to opt out). For further discussion, see infra
notes 187–202 and accompanying text.
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See Luks, supra note 16, at 2361.
165. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B) advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment.
166. See Jordan Elias, The Ascertainability Landscape and the Modern Affidavit, 84 TENN.
L. REV. 1, 10 (2016).
167. See supra text accompanying note 64. Conversely, ascertainability is often not
required in Rule 23(b)(2) actions. See Cole v. City of Memphis, 839 F.3d 530, 540 (6th Cir.
2016).
168. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment.
169. See Gilles, supra note 19, at 3110 (noting that the advisory committee has not altered
Rule 23 with respect to ascertainability since courts introduced this requirement).
170. See, e.g., Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 304 (3d Cir. 2013); DeBremaecker v.
Short, 433 F.2d 733, 734 (5th Cir. 1970); Krueger v. Wyeth, Inc., 310 F.R.D. 468, 473 (S.D.
Cal. 2015).
171. See Luks, supra note 16, at 2369.
172. See Geller, supra note 53, at 2778.
173. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(B); Geller, supra note 53, at 2778.
174. See Elias, supra note 166, at 15.
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Many circuits analyze the requirement through two prongs.175 The first
prong, which almost all circuits apply,176 requires precise class definitions
based on objective criteria.177 The second prong calls for an administratively
feasible method for the court to determine which exact individuals are
members of the proposed class.178 Unlike the first prong, courts do not
unanimously apply the second prong.179
A recent class action illuminates this split.180 In this New York case, a
class of individuals alleged that the defendant falsely advertised a product
that the class members had all recently purchased.181 The first prong of the
ascertainability requirement would have been satisfied because the class was
objectively defined.182 Yet, the ascertainability requirement would likely
have not been met in jurisdictions that apply the second prong because many
proposed claimants did not have receipts for the purchased products and,
therefore, could not have definitively proven their membership in the
class.183
The second prong’s heightened ascertainability ideal attempts to guarantee
the protection of litigants’ rights.184 Nonetheless, opponents feel that this
prong goes “too far” as it may enable defendants to limit their purchaser
records or otherwise circumvent potential liability.185 The circuits do agree,
however, that three types of classes fail this requirement’s first prong: (1)
“subjective” classes, (2) “vague” classes, and (3) “fail-safe” classes.186
Inspecting these three types of classes may help demonstrate whether
overbroad classes similarly fail ascertainability’s first prong.
First, a subjective class definition187 references its members’ mental
states.188 This occurs, for example, where claimants are defined as
“offended” or “deceived.”189 Such “subjective” members are, inherently, not
objectively identifiable.190
Second, vague class definitions similarly fail the ascertainability
requirement.191 A class that defines its members as “bald,” for example, is
175. See Karhu v. Vital Pharm., Inc., 621 F. App’x. 945, 948 (11th Cir. 2015); Carrera,
727 F.3d at 305.
176. See Elias, supra note 166, at 8.
177. See 1 MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 20, § 3:2.
178. See id. at 21–22.
179. See Elias, supra note 166, at 21.
180. See generally In re Scotts EZ Seed Litig., 304 F.R.D. 397 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
181. See id. at 404.
182. See id. at 404–05.
183. See id. at 407.
184. See Luks, supra note 16, at 2361.
185. See id. at 2393.
186. See Mullins v. Direct Dig., LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 660 (7th Cir. 2015); Young v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins., 693 F.3d 532, 537 (6th Cir. 2012); Chiang v. Veneman, 385 F.3d 256,
271 (3d Cir. 2004).
187. See Chiang, 385 F.3d at 271.
188. See Shaw, supra note 24, at 2378.
189. See id. at 2379.
190. See id. at 2364.
191. See Mullins, 795 F.3d at 660.
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considered vague.192 In this example, while one may think that one person
has hair, another may consider that same person to be bald.193 Thus, these
classes remain potentially boundless.194
Third, fail-safe classes, those defined by their success on the merits, also
fail ascertainability’s first prong.195 This type of definition may include all
individuals who were “wrongfully” denied something by a defendant.196 In
this scenario, claimants were either “wrongfully” denied something, which
guarantees them relief, or were not “wrongfully” denied something, which
makes them unbound to the litigation.197
Accordingly, these three types of class definitions make adequate notice
to relevant class members cumbersome.198 Courts, however, may actually
deny class certification in such instances because these definitions impede
their ability to objectively identify the injured class members.199 Remember,
the chief purpose of the implicit ascertainability requirement is to provide the
legitimate potential class members—those that are legally injured—with
adequate notice as to who else is a legitimate member of the potential class.
Only then may a legitimate class member be fully informed as to whether he
or she intends to opt out of the class. Perhaps, for example, a legitimate class
member does not want to be in a class with a certain group of individuals.
So, while overbroad class definitions may be objectively defined such that
the entire proposed class may be identified, it still presents the problem that
the legitimate members, those that will not be rooted out at a later stage in
the litigation, remain indistinguishable from the illegitimate members, those
that will be rooted out at a later stage in the litigation. Hence, it may be
argued that in this scenario the legitimate class members are not provided
adequate notice from the class definition to make a reasoned decision with
respect to their opt out rights.200
C. The Overbreadth Issue at Rule 23’s Class Certification Stage
The existence of uninjured class members at Rule 23(b)(3)’s class
certification stage causes many problems for litigants.201 Classes defined too
broadly include “a great number of members who for some reason could not
have been harmed by the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct.”202 This
manifestation, however, must be distinguished from classes that contain
members who “could have been harmed, but arguably might not have been
192. See Shaw, supra note 24, at 2381.
193. See id.
194. See Mullins, 795 F.3d at 660.
195. See Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 825 (7th Cir. 2012).
But see In re Rodriguez, 695 F.3d 360, 369 (5th Cir. 2012).
196. See Geller, supra note 53, at 2770.
197. See id. at 2771.
198. See supra text accompanying note 161.
199. See supra text accompanying note 162.
200. See Shaw, supra note 24, at 2383.
201. See supra text accompanying note 125.
202. Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 824 (7th Cir. 2012).
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for one reason or another.”203 So, overbroad classes include the former:
uninjured claimants who do not deserve the chance to recover.204 The
existence of these uninjured class members threatens to dilute relief for
legitimate claimants and creates the potential for defendants to be unjustly
found liable for meritless claims.205 Additionally, such overbreadth inhibits
a court’s ability to objectively identify the rightful claimants.206
In practice, overbreadth arises in many types of Rule 23(b)(3) actions.207
A claim involving the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) is
illustrative.208 Under the TCPA, a consumer has a cause of action when he
or she receives automated phone calls that he or she had not consented to.209
Hence, a class definition that includes all persons who received automated
phone calls from defendants210 may, for example, be overbroad as any class
member who consented to the phone calls had given up his or her right to
sue.211
Courts split when adjudicating this narrow issue. Importantly, the
Supreme Court has not provided guidance for lower courts and it recently
punted on deciding whether Rule 23(b)(3) classes may be certified where
some uninjured members exist.212 Consequently, class certification may be
warranted for marginally overbroad classes.213 Class certification in these
instances may encourage justice to the class’s majority and only subject
defendants to minimal illegitimate liability. Moreover, some circuits have
indicated that marginally overbroad classes may be certified because the
uninjured class members may be displaced at later stages of the litigation.214
203. See id.
204. See Shaw, supra note 24, at 2383.
205. See id. at 2384–85.
206. See Geoff Wyatt & Jordan Schwartz, Overbroad Class Actions: Here To Stay or
Going Out of Style?, A.B.A. (Sept. 9, 2015), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/
committees/classactions/articles/summer2015-0915-overbroad-class-actions.html
[https://perma.cc/4X73-5RUB] (explaining how injured class members are legitimate
claimants). Overbreadth is not an issue in Rule 23(b)(2) class certification. See supra text
accompanying note 117.
207. See, e.g., Booth v. Appstack, Inc., No. C13-1533JLR, 2016 WL 3030256, at *6–7
(W.D. Wash. May 25, 2016); Jamison v. First Credit Servs., 290 F.R.D. 92, 103 (N.D. Ill.
2013).
208. See, e.g., Jamison, 290 F.R.D. at 92–104.
209. See id. at 96–97.
210. See id. at 103.
211. See supra text accompanying note 208.
212. See Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1050 (2016) (noting that “the
question [of] whether uninjured class members may recover” could not be answered here even
though it “is one of great importance”). This Note does not focus on whether classes should
be certified where marginal overbreadth exists.
213. See, e.g., Torres v. Mercer Canyons Inc., 835 F.3d 1125, 1136 (9th Cir. 2016)
(indicating that class definitions may “[i]nevitably contain some individuals who have
suffered no harm”). For further discussion, see Andrew J. Pincus, What Does Tyson Foods,
Inc. v. Bouaphakeo Mean for Class Actions?, CLASS DEF. BLOG (Mar. 23, 2016),
https://www.classdefenseblog.com/2016/03/what-does-tyson-foods-inc-v-bouaphakeomean-for-class actions/ [https://perma.cc/EBE4-PLF9].
214. See Torres, 835 F.3d at 1136; Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d
802, 823 (7th Cir. 2012).
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This type of class action, while not perfect, may still be superior to other
forms of litigation.215 Other circuits disagree.216 These courts contend that
uninjured class members may not be included in certified classes217 because,
among other issues, such individuals have insufficient Article III standing.218
Nonetheless, every circuit denies class certification219 for irreparably
overbroad class definitions.220 The actual analysis remains flexible221 as
many courts have inconsistently applied Rule 23’s class certification
requirements when this issue has arisen.222 Some have treated overbreadth
as a predominance issue because the requirement’s hallmark is a common
form of liability.223 Others, however, have analyzed overbreadth under the
ascertainability requirement due to concerns regarding an inability to identify
legitimate claimants.224 And, irrespective of past class certification results,
this inconsistency has resulted in litigant confusion.225 This veil of
uncertainty, of course, is something the Rule 23 advisory committee sought
to avoid.226
Consider recent class actions in the Seventh Circuit, where overbreadth is
alternatively analyzed under predominance and ascertainability
215. See supra text accompanying note 122.
216. See, e.g., In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig., 725 F.3d 244, 252 (D.C.
Cir. 2013); In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Exp. Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d 6, 28 (1st Cir.
2008); Denney v. Deutsche Bank, 443 F.3d 253, 263–64 (2d Cir. 2006).
217. For further discussion on this split, see BakerHostetler, Hospital Seeks Second
Opinion on Certifying Class with Uninjured Members, JD SUPRA (June 13, 2017),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/hospital-seeks-second-opinion-on-35514/
[https://perma.cc/DJW2-ZDBJ].
218. Overbreadth may be treated as an Article III standing issue. See generally Theane
Evangelis & Bradley J. Hamburger, Article III Standing and Absent Class Members, 64
EMORY L.J. 383 (2014).
219. See, e.g., Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 666 F.3d 581, 596 (9th Cir. 2012); Carter v.
PJS of Parma, Inc., No. 1:15 CV 1545, 2016 WL 3387597, at *2 (N.D. Ohio June 20, 2016).
220. Courts may amend class definitions where possible. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d)(4).
Thus, a court may narrow an overbroad class definition to eliminate those who do not have
legitimate claims. See Vincent v. Money Store, 304 F.R.D. 446, 453 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
221. There are sporadic instances where the Rule 23(a) requirements have been utilized
alongside the predominance or ascertainability requirement during overbreadth analysis. See,
e.g., Rodman v. Safeway, Inc., No. 11-CV-03003-JST, 2014 WL 988992, at *4–10 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 10, 2014); Loreto v. Procter & Gamble Co., No. 1:09-CV-815, 2013 WL 6055401, at
*4–5 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 15, 2013). However, the denial of class certification based on
irreparable overbreadth for Rule 23(b)(3) classes is indeed due to the failure to meet the
predominance or ascertainability requirement. See, e.g., Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154,
168–69 (3d Cir. 2015); Walewski v. ZeniMax Media, Inc., 502 F. App’x 857, 861 (11th Cir.
2012).
222. See supra text accompanying note 23.
223. See, e.g., Mazza, 666 F.3d at 596; Circle Click Media LLC v. Regus Mgmt. Grp. LLC,
No. 3:12-CV-04000-SC, 2015 WL 6638929, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2015); supra text
accompanying note 127.
224. See, e.g., Carter, 2016 WL 3387597, at *2; PB Prop. Mgmt., Inc. v. Goodman Mfg.,
No. 3:12-CV-1366-HES-JBT, 2016 WL 7666179, at *19 (M.D. Fla. May 12, 2016); Vigus v.
S. Ill. Riverboat/Casino Cruises, Inc., 274 F.R.D. 229, 234 (S.D. Ill. 2011).
225. See, e.g., PB Prop. Mgmt., 2016 WL 7666179, at *26 (referencing the defendant’s
arguments to analyze the overbreadth issue under both the ascertainability and predominance
requirements).
226. See supra text accompanying notes 53, 66.
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requirements.227 In 2011228 and 2013,229 for example, courts there chose to
analyze overbreadth under the ascertainability requirement. Alternatively, in
2015230 and 2016,231 the same courts insisted that these prior decisions were
too stringent.232 The Seventh Circuit even stipulated that the ascertainability
requirement was “susceptible to misinterpretation” and clarified that only
vague, subjective, and fail-safe classes should fail ascertainability’s first
prong.233 Nonetheless, two separate district courts in the same circuit
subsequently analyzed overbreadth under the ascertainability inquiry and
held that the issue was indeed directly related to the implicit requirement’s
first prong.234 Clearly, due in part to such inconsistency, litigants in the
Seventh Circuit have been subjected to unpredictable overbreadth
analysis.235
The next Part discusses the two distinct causes of inconsistent overbreadth
analysis at the Rule 23(b)(3) class certification stage.236 First, many courts
prefer to analyze overbreadth under either predominance or ascertainability
due to supported policy reasons.237 Second, other courts merely acquiesce
to how litigants frame their overbreadth arguments—whether under
predominance or ascertainability—without explaining their reasoning.238
II. THE JUDICIAL DIVIDE ON OVERBREADTH ANALYSIS AND THE
RESULTANT INEFFECTIVE LITIGATION
As detailed, the inconsistent application of Rule 23(b)(3)’s class
certification requirements may produce uncertainty in litigation. This Part
describes examples of case law that demonstrate how litigants may be
adversely affected by this uncertainty. Part II.A focuses on examples that
derive from divergent judicial preferences for either ascertainability or
predominance; Part II.B spotlights examples that derive from seemingly
blind judicial acquiescence to litigants’ preferences.
227. Compare Mullins v. Direct Dig., LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 659–61 (7th Cir. 2015)
(indicating that overbreadth analysis does not belong within the ascertainability inquiry), and
Meinders v. Emery Wilson Corp., No. 14-CV-596-SMY-SCW, 2016 WL 3402621, at *4 n.4.
(S.D. Ill. June 21, 2016), with Wright v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC, No. 14 C 10457, 2016 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 115729, at *14–18 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 29, 2016), Bietsch v. Sergeant’s Pet Care
Prods., Inc., No. 15 C 5432, 2016 WL 1011512, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 2016), Jamison v.
First Credit Servs., 290 F.R.D. 92, 96 (N.D. Ill. 2013), and Vigus, 274 F.R.D. at 232.
228. See Vigus, 274 F.R.D. at 232–36.
229. See Jamison, 290 F.R.D. at 96, 108.
230. See Mullins, 795 F.3d at 659–60.
231. See Meinders, 2016 WL 3402621, at *4 n.4.
232. See Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 818–20 (7th Cir.
2012).
233. See Mullins, 795 F.3d at 659–60.
234. See Wright v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC, No. 14 C 10457, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
115729, at *14–18 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 29, 2016); Bietsch v. Sergeant’s Pet Care Prods., Inc., No.
15 C 5432, 2016 WL 1011512, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 2016).
235. See infra Part II.A.
236. See infra Parts II.A–B.
237. See infra Part II.A.
238. See infra Part II.B for examples of such cases.
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A. Inconsistent Overbreadth Analysis That Derives
from Divergent Judicial Preferences
There are genuine explanations for why courts analyze overbreadth under
either the predominance or ascertainability requirement. Yet, these policy
reasons are often contradictory. Notwithstanding the validity of these
varying approaches, this inconsistency must be recognized to further
understand its consequences.
1. The Predominance Preference
Three recent cases particularly illustrate why some courts prefer to analyze
overbreadth under the predominance requirement: Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc.,239
Circle Click Media LLC v. Regus Management Group LLC,240 and
Matamoros v. Starbucks Corp.241
a. The Third Circuit: Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc.
Crystal and Bryan Byrd rented a laptop computer from an Aaron’s
franchisee store, a consumer-electronics lessor, in the summer of 2010.242
Five months later, an employee from the store went to the Byrds’ home to
repossess the laptop.243 While at the house, the employee presented
screenshots of Bryan Byrd’s internet activity.244 Unsurprisingly, the Byrds
considered the screenshots to be an unauthorized invasion of their privacy.245
They then brought a Rule 23(b)(3) action against Aaron’s and its franchisee
store for their alleged violations of the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act (ECPA).246 Parties are liable under the ECPA when they intentionally
intercept the contents of an electronic communication.247
The store obtained these screenshots through spyware that it had installed
on its computers.248 The Byrds alleged that this spyware accessed their
laptop 347 times and retrieved information from the computers of nearly 900
other customers.249 As a result, the Byrds defined the class as all persons,
and their household members, who “leased and/or purchased” computers
from the defendants and who had not consented to the spyware
installation.250

239. 784 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 2015).
240. No. 12-CV-04000-SC, 2015 WL 6638929 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2015).
241. 699 F.3d 129 (1st Cir. 2012).
242. See Byrd v. Aaron’s, Inc., No. 11-101E, 2014 WL 1316055, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 31,
2014), rev’d, 784 F.3d 154.
243. See Byrd, 784 F.3d at 159.
244. See id.
245. See id.
246. See Byrd, 2014 WL 1316055, at *2.
247. See id. at *4.
248. See id.
249. See id.
250. See id. at *5.
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The store then argued that the class definition was overbroad because
many proposed members did not have their communications intercepted by
the spyware.251 The district court agreed252 and denied class certification
because the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the ascertainability requirement.253
The court asserted that this requirement was not met, in part, due to its
inability to “objectively” identify the injured class members.254 Notably, it
did not analyze Rule 23’s explicit requirements because it felt that
ascertainability was an “essential prerequisite.”255
The class appealed, arguing that the district court should not have denied
class certification on the basis of ascertainability.256 On appeal, the Third
Circuit did not refute that the class was overbroad.257 However, it indicated
that the district court erred in its analysis because the class definition “easily”
met ascertainability’s first prong.258 It stated that all persons referenced in
the class definition were readily identifiable, which alleviated any notice or
finality concerns.259 The Third Circuit also clarified that the ascertainability
requirement does not ask whether the injured members may be objectively
identified from the uninjured members.260 It noted that “differences between
the proposed class should be considered within the rubric of the relevant Rule
23 requirement” and not injected into the ascertainability evaluation.261
Consequently, it remanded the case for the liability issue to be analyzed under
the predominance requirement.262
On remand, the district court did not conflate the Third Circuit’s
interpretation of ascertainability with Rule 23’s other requirements.263 It
found that the class sufficiently satisfied the ascertainability requirement.264
Nonetheless, it held that individualized questions predominated over
common ones.265 According to the court, the essential element of the claim,
injury under the ECPA, was not common among the class.266 As a result, it
found that certification was inappropriate because the liability issue
presented “difficulties in managing [the] class action.”267 The Byrd litigation
demonstrates some of the strongest arguments for courts to analyze
overbreadth under the predominance inquiry.
251. See id.
252. See id.
253. See id.
254. See id.
255. See id. at *3.
256. See Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 158–59 (3d Cir. 2015).
257. See id. at 168.
258. See id. at 169–71.
259. See id.
260. See id.
261. See id. at 169.
262. See id. at 159.
263. See generally Byrd v. Aaron’s, Inc., No. 11-101, 2017 WL 4326106 (W.D. Pa. Aug.
4, 2017), adopted by 2017 WL 4269715 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 26, 2017).
264. See id. at *7 n.6.
265. See id. at *14.
266. See id.
267. See id. at *17.
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b. The Ninth Circuit: Circle Click Media LLC v.
Regus Management Group LLC
Circle Click Media is another example of how a district court analyzed
overbreadth under the predominance inquiry.268 Regus, the defendant,
operated as a lessor of commercial office space and offered fully equipped
offices to consumers for an all-inclusive monthly price.269 Regus made
representations to the plaintiffs that its services were to be agreed to through
a one-page Office Service Agreement (OSA).270 The controversy here
originated because the defendant’s invoices allegedly exceeded the amount
indicated in the OSA via “various mandatory fees disclosed in other
documents.”271 For example, Circle Click, a plaintiff, finalized an OSA with
Regus for two offices in San Francisco.272 Circle Click alleged that it “relied
on Regus’s advertisements indicating Regus offered [office space] . . . for a
Yet, Circle Click stated that Regus charged
single . . . price.”273
“significantly more” via additional fees not listed in the OSA.274
Consequently, Circle Click, and others similarly situated, alleged a myriad
of claims involving Regus’s fee structure.275 The plaintiffs moved to certify
two classes, a New York class and a California class, which were both
defined to include “all persons” who executed agreements with Regus and
who were exposed to mandatory fees not referenced in the OSA.276
Notwithstanding the legitimacy of some of the underlying claims, Regus
argued that the proposed classes, as defined, were overbroad.277 The district
court agreed.278 The court held that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the
predominance requirement even though Regus’s website was “inherently
applicable to the whole class.”279 In particular, it found that individualized
questions regarding a common form of liability significantly outweighed
common contentions.280 Here, because many class members, albeit a
minority, were not exposed to the allegedly illicit fees, the proposed class
definitions caused unsalvageable manageability issues.281 Accordingly, the
court primarily focused on the existence of the illegitimate claimants in its
predominance analysis.282

268. See Circle Click Media LLC v. Regus Mgmt. Grp. LLC, No. 3:12-CV-04000-SC,
2015 WL 6638929, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2015).
269. See id. at *1.
270. See id.
271. See id.
272. See id. at *2.
273. See id.
274. See id.
275. See id. at *3.
276. See id. at *7.
277. See id. at *12.
278. See id. at *15.
279. See id. at *14.
280. See id. at *15.
281. See id. at *13–15.
282. See id.
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c. The First Circuit: Matamoros v. Starbucks Corp.
The court in Matamoros v. Starbucks Corp. also chose to scrutinize
However, in
overbreadth under the predominance requirement.283
Matamoros, the court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification.284
The Massachusetts Tips Act provides that “wait staff” employees are not
required to share customer tips with non-“wait staff” employees.285 Here,
Starbucks’s mandatory employee policy stated that its customer tips were to
be distributed to both baristas and shift supervisors.286 Under the Tips Act,
“wait staff” employees, such as the Starbucks baristas, are defined as service
providers who have “no managerial responsibility.”287 Here, the baristas
alleged that the shift supervisors did not qualify as “wait staff” employees.288
As a result, the baristas filed a Rule 23(b)(3) suit against the company for its
alleged violation of the Tips Act.289
Starbucks stated that the shift supervisors performed more duties than the
baristas and were actually “promoted from the ranks of baristas.”290 Due to
this evidence, the district court ultimately found that the shift supervisors did
not qualify as “wait staff” employees.291 In doing so, it granted summary
judgment for the plaintiffs.292 Starbucks then appealed.293 The company
contended that the district court should not have certified the allegedly
unascertainable class because “certain experienced baristas” included in the
class definition had provided “coaching” to less experienced baristas.294
Therefore, it argued that the class was overbroad because these experienced
baristas did not qualify as “wait staff” employees.295
The First Circuit, however, vehemently disagreed.296 It found this
ascertainability argument to be “frivolous” and stressed that the plaintiffs
satisfied the inquiry irrespective of the class’s potential overbreadth because
the class definition precisely defined its members based on objective
criteria.297 The First Circuit also indicated that this issue was actually better
suited for the predominance inquiry.298 And, as for this potential
overbreadth, it held that the baristas who offered assistance did not maintain
any managerial responsibilities.299 Thus, it found that the plaintiffs satisfied
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.

See Matamoros v. Starbucks Corp., 699 F.3d 129, 139 (1st Cir. 2012).
See id. at 129.
See id. at 133.
See id. at 132.
See id. at 133.
See id. at 132.
See id.
See id. at 133–34.
See id. at 132–33.
Id.
See id. at 133.
See id. at 138–39.
See id.
See id. at 141.
See id. at 139.
See id.
See id.
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the predominance requirement because Starbucks’s corporate policy, the
alleged violations of a single statute, and the general job responsibilities of
the baristas “greatly” outweighed individualized questions.300
Similar to the courts in Byrd and Circle Click Media, the Matamoros court
referenced many significant justifications for analyzing overbreadth under
the predominance requirement. Part II.A.1.d describes these arguments in
detail.
d. Policy Reasons for the Predominance Preference
The predominance requirement, in particular, enables Rule 23(b)(3)’s
effectiveness because it ensures that class members are sufficiently
similar.301 Naturally, this requirement’s “hallmark” is the finding of a
common form of liability.302 But a finding of a common form of liability is
not always dispositive for class certification as courts must balance all
individualized and common issues.303 While a common form of liability is
the key to the predominance inquiry, the inquiry still mandates that all
individualized and common issues must be balanced. The predominance
requirement may actually be satisfied when minimal liability issues diverge.
So, if the overbreadth issue becomes a per se failure under ascertainability
analysis, then some marginally overbroad classes, which can satisfy the
predominance requirement, may never get past the class certification
stage.304
In practice, marginally overbroad classes may never even reach the
predominance inquiry in jurisdictions that analyze overbreadth under the
ascertainability requirement.305 Hence, this type of ascertainability analysis
essentially makes marginal overbreadth dispositive to the class inquiry.306
Conversely, when marginal overbreadth is analyzed under the predominance
inquiry and an objectively defined class definition has already satisfied the
ascertainability requirement’s first prong, courts will grant class
certification.307
2. The Ascertainability Preference
Courts that do not choose to analyze overbreadth under the predominance
requirement frequently scrutinize the issue under the ascertainability
300. See id. The court scrutinized overbreadth under the predominance inquiry because
the three factors mentioned in the text involve the standard of liability for this statute. Hence,
by analyzing overbreadth with respect to such factors, the court framed the predominance
inquiry through the lens of a common form of liability among the class.
301. See supra text accompanying note 135.
302. See supra text accompanying note 127.
303. See supra text accompanying note 123. Alternatively, the ascertainability requirement
may not permit this balancing. See Mullins v. Direct Dig., LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 657 (7th Cir.
2015).
304. See supra text accompanying note 260.
305. See supra text accompanying note 254.
306. See supra text accompanying note 254.
307. See supra text accompanying notes 136–38.
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requirement.308 When many illegitimate claimants exist, many courts prefer
the ascertainability inquiry for such analysis because a broadly applied
predominance requirement may actually increase the risk of judicial error by
expanding courts’ discretion at the class certification stage.309
a. The Seventh Circuit: Vigus v. Southern Illinois
Riverboat/Casino Cruises, Inc.
In Vigus, the defendant company (“Casino Cruises”) regularly called
members of its loyalty program with prerecorded messages to alert them of
special offerings.310 The program had over 100,000 members at the time of
the 2011 litigation.311 As for the program members themselves, the
defendant noted that only those who had affirmatively provided their
telephone numbers were added to its call list.312 Yet, Richard Vigus, the
named plaintiff, stated that he received automated voice messages from
Casino Cruises to which he had not consented.313 Vigus maintained that he
was never even a member of the program.314 As noted above, a party is liable
under the TCPA when it makes automated phone calls to individuals without
their prior consent.315 Consequently, Vigus brought a Rule 23(b)(3) action
against Casino Cruises for its alleged violations of the TCPA.316
Vigus defined the class as all persons who received automated phone calls
from Casino Cruises.317 This definition, however, made no reference to
whether its members had consented to the phone calls.318 As a result, Casino
Cruises argued that the class definition included too many illegitimate
claimants.319 While Vigus was not a member of the program, many potential
members had affirmatively provided their telephone numbers to the
defendant.320 This, of course, eradicated their causes of action.321 For this
reason, the district court denied class certification.322
The district court analyzed this overbreadth issue under the ascertainability
requirement.323 It stated that the plaintiffs had not “sufficiently” crafted the
class definition “so as to [produce an] identifiable . . . class.”324 The court
308. See, e.g., Walewski v. ZeniMax Media, Inc., 502 F. App’x 857, 861 (11th Cir. 2012);
Carter v. PJS of Parma, Inc., No. 15 CV 1545, 2016 WL 3387597, at *2 (N.D. Ohio June 20,
2016); Vigus v. S. Ill. Riverboat/Casino Cruises, Inc., 274 F.R.D. 229, 231–32 (S.D. Ill. 2011).
309. See supra text accompanying notes 136–38.
310. See Vigus, 274 F.R.D. at 231–32.
311. See id. at 232.
312. See id.
313. See id.
314. See id.
315. See supra text accompanying note 209.
316. See Vigus, 274 F.R.D. at 232–33.
317. See id.
318. See id. at 233.
319. See id. at 235.
320. See id.
321. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
322. See Vigus, 274 F.R.D. at 238.
323. See id. at 235.
324. See id.
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stated that “the process of determining who fell within such a class could not
be determined by objective criteria applicable to the class as a whole.”325 In
asserting this, the court placed great importance on its inability to identify the
injured members from the class definition.326
Interestingly, the court continued on with its class certification analysis.327
On the issue of predominance, it stated that individualized inquiries
outweighed common ones.328 But, it determined that whether the defendant
had called any of the legitimate class members was just one factor in this
analysis.329
b. The Eleventh Circuit: Walewski v. ZeniMax Media, Inc.
In Walewski v. ZeniMax Media, Inc.,330 the court, alternatively, did not
undergo any predominance analysis and instead denied class certification
solely on the basis of ascertainability.331
Lawrence Walewski adored playing the video game The Elder Scrolls IV:
Oblivion.332 Walewski loved it so much that he spent roughly 450 hours
playing during a four-month period.333 At that point, the game allegedly
malfunctioned so that he was “unable to open doors and gates, cast spells, or
trigger numerous other animations that were essential.”334 As a result of
these defects, Walewski felt that the defendants unlawfully represented how
the game play could go on “indefinitely.”335 He also noted that these defects
made the game substantially less valuable than the marked purchased
price.336 Consequently, Walewski filed a Rule 23(b)(3) action against the
defendants, the game’s developer and studio producer, for their alleged
violations of consumer-protection laws.337
The district court held that the class definition, which included all persons
who purchased the game,338 was substantially overbroad because many
claimants were never exposed to the alleged defects and the value of the game
was never diminished for them.339 Moreover, it stated that several claimants
did not even directly purchase the game.340 Thus, because the court could

325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.

See id.
See id. at 236–37.
See id.
See id.
See id.
502 F. App’x 857 (11th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 861–62.
See id. at 859.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 859–60.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 861.
See id.
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not identify the injured claimants from the class definition, it denied class
certification on the basis of ascertainability.341
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed this decision.342 Like the district court, the
Eleventh Circuit asserted that the plaintiff failed to satisfy the ascertainability
requirement due to the overbroad class definition.343 Specifically, it held that
to “cull” the injured class members from millions of other game owners was
too cumbersome.344 In doing so, it approved of how the district court applied
the class certification requirements.345
c. The Sixth Circuit: Carter v. PJS of Parma, Inc.
As opposed to Walewski, Carter v. PJS of Parma, Inc.346 involved a Rule
23(b)(3) action that pled claims of unjust enrichment.347 The defendants in
Carter, PJS of Parma and Lorraine Stancato, owned and operated Stancato’s
Italian Restaurant in Ohio.348 They also maintained an off-site catering
service and hired banquet servers—the plaintiffs—to staff the events.349 For
catering payments, the restaurant charged its customers for food and drinks
as well as a “banquet service charge.”350 These service charges did not
constitute tips.351 However, customers often provided additional tips to the
restaurant, which it was then required to distribute to the servers.352 Several
of the servers alleged that the restaurant had not distributed many of the due
tips.353 In turn, the plaintiffs defined their proposed class as all banquet
servers who worked for the defendants.354
A district court subsequently denied class certification in part because the
proposed class definition was substantially overbroad.355 This particular
class was overbroad because many of the included servers were not the
intended recipients of certain customer tips.356 Thus, as the court indicated,
the defendants could not have been “unjustly enriched” at the expense of
these uninjured class members.357 As for the class certification requirements,
the court stated that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the ascertainability inquiry

341. See generally Walewski v. ZeniMax Media, Inc., No. 11-CV-1178-ORL-28DAB,
2012 WL 834125 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 30, 2012), adopted by 2012 WL 847236 (M.D. Fla. Mar.
13, 2012), aff’d, 502 F. App’x 857.
342. See Walewski, 502 F. App’x at 862.
343. See id. at 861.
344. See id.
345. See id.
346. No. 15 CV 1545, 2016 WL 3387597 (N.D. Ohio June 20, 2016).
347. See id. at *1.
348. See id.
349. See id.
350. See id.
351. See id.
352. See id.
353. See id.
354. See id.
355. See id. at *3–6.
356. See id. at *2.
357. See id.
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because the class definition included too many uninjured members.358 The
court further noted that the requirement failed because this definition
inhibited its ability to identify the legitimate claimants.359
The court also held that the class “easily” failed to satisfy the
predominance requirement because fact-specific questions outweighed
common contentions.360 But, it did not frame this inquiry as an overbreadth
problem.361 Rather, the court focused on other individualized inquiries—
such as which severs worked at which banquets, if many customer tips were
intended for individual banquet servers, and which factors motivated the
customer tips.362 Accordingly, Vigus, Walewski, and Carter exemplify why
many courts analyze overbreadth under the ascertainability requirement.
d. Policy Reasons for the Ascertainability Preference
The ascertainability requirement is where courts query the suitability of
class definitions for pending Rule 23(b)(3) litigation.363 Of course, a
substantially overbroad class definition is particularly unsuitable for such
litigation due to the inevitable necessity for individualized inquiries.364 The
ascertainability requirement also helps to ensure that class definitions enable
adequate notice for litigants.365 And, as stated above, overbroad class
definitions impair such notice.366 Thus, many feel that claimants may be
unknowingly forced into litigation and defendants may be subjected to
possible interminable liability when the overbreadth issue is not scrutinized
under this requirement.367 So, perhaps, overbreadth scrutiny under the
ascertainability inquiry may ensure that legitimate claimants remain
objectively identifiable throughout the course of litigation.368
There are, however, deficiencies in this line of reasoning.369 First, the
appearance of conflating the explicit requirements of Rule 23(a) with the
implicit requirement of ascertainability is inherently troublesome.370
Second, this broad interpretation of ascertainability may lead to the disposal
of many actions where marginal overbreadth exists.371 Third, perhaps
overbreadth alone does not inhibit adequate notice.372 Overbreadth, in fact,

358.
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See supra text accompanying notes 157–68.
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may only hamper a litigant’s ability to categorize the injured members from
an otherwise objectively identifiable class.373
3. The Resultant Unnecessary Litigation Costs
and the Potential for Forum Shopping
Further examination of two of the cases analyzed above—Byrd and
Walewski—illustrates how divergent analytical preferences for overbreadth
analysis may expose litigants to unnecessary litigation costs and the potential
for forum shopping.374
a. The Unnecessary Litigation Costs
Revisiting the Byrd and Walewski litigations is necessary to comprehend
how the overbreadth issue leads to unnecessary costs for litigants. In Byrd,
the district court denied class certification on the basis of ascertainability due
to irreparable overbreadth.375 Then, following the plaintiffs’ appeal, the
circuit court remanded the case for the overbreadth issue to be analyzed under
the predominance requirement.376 Finally, after three years of litigation, a
district court once again denied class certification.377 This time, however,
the court did so under the predominance inquiry.378
All parties were subjected to more than three years of avoidable motion
practice and briefing.379 In 2014, for example, after class certification was
initially denied, the plaintiffs were forced to explain how the district court
erred in its ascertainability analysis.380 In this brief, the plaintiffs primarily
detailed how the district court misinterpreted its circuit’s precedent regarding
the requirement’s satisfaction.381 They noted that “the implicit requirement
of ascertainability [had been] met” when similarly situated plaintiffs had
objectively defined their classes.382 In sum, they argued that whether they
could have recovered on the merits of the claims was “not an appropriate
inquiry in the context of evaluating” ascertainability.383
Following this, the defendants asserted that the district court had indeed
correctly denied class certification on the basis of ascertainability because
the proposed class definition was “overbroad.”384 Though, in response, the
plaintiffs countered that the defendants had likewise misinterpreted the

373. See supra text accompanying notes 157–68.
374. See, e.g., supra Parts II.A.1.a, II.A.2.b.
375. See supra text accompanying notes 253–59.
376. See supra text accompanying notes 256–64.
377. See supra text accompanying notes 263–70.
378. See supra text accompanying notes 263–70.
379. See infra Part IV.
380. See Brief of Appellants at 38, Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 2015) (No.
14-3050).
381. See id. at 24–35.
382. See id. at 30.
383. Id. at 34.
384. See Brief for Appellee-Defendant at 8, 28, Byrd, 784 F.3d 154 (No. 14-3050).
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ascertainability requirement.385 Here, the plaintiffs cited another case from
within the Third Circuit that indicated that the inquiry generally does not
involve an examination of a common form of liability.386 They next directed
that this problem should have instead been analyzed under the predominance
requirement because their class definition did not need to “include elements”
of their claims.387 Accordingly, this prolonged back and forth exhibits just
some of the preventable litigation that has resulted from this circuit’s
inconsistency in overbreadth analysis.388
Like in Byrd, Walewski involved preventable litigation over the
overbreadth issue.389 However, unlike in Byrd, the circuit court affirmed the
denial of class certification.390 In Walewski, a magistrate judge initially
recommended that class certification be denied because the proposed class
was overbroad and unascertainable.391 Walewski, the plaintiff, immediately
objected to this report and cited several cases from within the same circuit to
dispute the judge’s reasoning.392 Among many challenges, he argued that
his class definition satisfied the ascertainability requirement because “the
Court can readily and objectively ascertain whether any individual is a
member of the proposed class through a single inquiry: whether the
consumer purchased a copy [of the game].”393 Correspondingly, he noted
that the potential overbreadth should have instead been analyzed under the
predominance requirement.394
The defendants, of course, agreed with the magistrate judge’s preliminary
recommendation.395 Their initial brief similarly consisted of several pages
devoted to applicable precedent.396 However, as opposed to Walewski, they
cited cases from within the circuit to demonstrate that the ascertainability
requirement is not met when substantial overbreadth exists because such
class definitions inhibit a court’s ability to identify injured claimants.397
Later on, unfortunately for Walewski, the circuit court agreed with the
defendants’ reasoning and affirmed the denial of class certification.398

385. See Reply Brief of Appellants at 1, 9, Byrd, 784 F.3d 154 (No. 14-3050).
386. See id. at 6–7.
387. See id. at 8.
388. See supra text accompanying notes 263–70.
389. See, e.g., Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 38, Walewski v. ZeniMax Media, Inc., 502
F. App’x 857 (11th Cir. 2012) (No. 12-11843); Joint Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 22,
Walewski, 502 F. App’x 857.
390. See Walewski, 502 F. App’x at 861–62.
391. See Walewski v. ZeniMax Media, Inc., No. 11-CV-1178-ORL-28DAB, 2012 WL
834125, at *4–6 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 30, 2012), adopted by 2012 WL 847236 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 13,
2012), aff’d, 502 F. App’x 857.
392. See Plaintiff’s Objections to the Magistrate Judge’s January 30, 2012 Report and
Recommendation at 1, 8–10, Walewski, 2012 WL 847236 (No. 11-cv-01178), ECF No. 55.
393. Id. at 9.
394. See id.
395. See Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s Objection to the Magistrate Judge’s Report
and Recommendation at 1, Walewski, 2012 WL 847236 (No. 11-cv-01178), ECF No. 57.
396. See id. at 3–7.
397. See id. at 4.
398. See Walewski v. ZeniMax Media, Inc., 502 F. App’x 857, 861 (11th Cir. 2012).
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Rule 23 litigation is very expensive for litigants.399 Yet, as just described,
the Byrd and Walewski cases present examples when this litigation may be
unnecessarily costly.400 The plaintiffs’ attorneys, for example, squandered
their time litigating the overbreadth issue.401 And their time is valuable
because these attorneys typically work on contingencies.402 Similarly, the
defendants were likely excessively billed for this same preventable litigation.
So, these examples plainly demonstrate how inconsistent overbreadth
analysis materializes in needless costs. These added litigation costs may also
create a potential for forum shopping.403
b. The Potential for Forum Shopping
Forum shopping is unfair because similarly situated parties should not be
subjected to inconsistent opportunities and costs in litigation based on the
forum.404 For an illustration of this point, consider the plaintiffs in Byrd and
Walewski. They may have only been able to bring their suits in one
jurisdiction.405 If so, then these parties had to remain in forums that had
wavered on overbreadth.406 Conversely, other, similarly situated plaintiffs
may have been able to choose between multiple forums. These other
plaintiffs would have presumably chosen forums that had consistently
analyzed overbreadth to avoid this potential for preventable litigation.407
Thus, under this scenario, the Byrd and Walewski plaintiffs would have been
subjected to disproportionate costs merely because of procedural
technicalities.408
It is understandable why plaintiffs would forum shop under these
circumstances.409 Though, as the next section explains, other courts have not
demonstrated one specific preference for where overbreadth should be
analyzed at the class certification stage.410 Instead, many courts have blindly
acquiesced to litigants’ analytical structures.411

399. See supra text accompanying notes 73, 78.
400. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 379, 388.
401. See supra text accompanying notes 76–77.
402. See generally 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 15, § 1:18.
403. See supra text accompanying note 14.
404. See supra text accompanying notes 44–45.
405. There are many reasons why a named plaintiff in this scenario would be unable to
choose between multiple forums. See, e.g., 2 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 15, § 6:28 (discussing
the role of personal jurisdiction in Rule 23 actions).
406. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 381–93, 389–98.
407. See Sharma, supra note 45, at 844.
408. See supra Part II.A.3.a.
409. See supra text accompanying note 44.
410. See PB Prop. Mgmt., Inc. v. Goodman Mfg., No. 12-CV-1366-HES-JBT, 2016 WL
7666179, at *20 (M.D. Fla. May 12, 2016); Jamison v. First Credit Servs., 290 F.R.D. 92, 108
(N.D. Ill. 2013).
411. See PB Prop. Mgmt., 2016 WL 7666179, at *20; Jamison, 290 F.R.D. at 108.
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B. Inconsistent Overbreadth Analysis That Derives
from Judicial Acquiescence
This Note describes how litigant confusion persists where courts analyze
overbreadth in divergent ways. Naturally, this same confusion also persists
when courts acquiesce to defendants’ imprecise overbreadth arguments.
Jamison v. First Credit Services412 and PB Property Management Group
LLC v. Goodman Manufacturing,413 described below, demonstrate how such
confusion likewise leads to unnecessary litigation costs and the potential for
forum shopping.
1. The Resultant Unnecessary Litigation Costs
Jamison presents another example where a district court denied class
certification for an action under the TCPA, in part, due to an overbroad class
definition.414 The court in Jamison, however, addressed many of the issues
“as they were framed” by the defendant because it agreed that there was a
“substantial overlap” between the ascertainability and predominance
requirements.415 As a result, the court acquiesced to the defendant and
exclusively analyzed overbreadth under the ascertainability inquiry.416
Following this denial of class certification, the plaintiffs asked the court to
reconsider.417 They particularly asserted that the court “misapprehended the
facts”418 because the proposed class was indeed ascertainable.419 They also
cited cases within the circuit to show that the potential overbreadth should
have been analyzed under the predominance requirement.420 In turn, the
plaintiffs extensively detailed how these two inquiries are meant to be quite
distinct.421
Still, the court denied this request for reconsideration.422 It did not explain
why the predominance and ascertainability requirements “overlapped” so as
to allow for interchangeable overbreadth analysis.423 Instead, the court
similarly repeated the defendant’s ascertainability arguments without
addressing many of the plaintiffs’ main objections.424 Consequently, the
plaintiffs may have been inhibited from properly asserting their
predominance arguments solely because of the apparent deference.425 Courts
412. 290 F.R.D. 92.
413. 2016 WL 7666179.
414. See Jamison, 290 F.R.D. at 108–09.
415. See id. at 108.
416. See id. at 108–09.
417. See Motion for Reconsideration at 1, Jamison v. First Credit Servs., No. 12-C-4415,
2013 WL 3872171 (N.D. Ill. July 29, 2013), ECF No. 105.
418. See id.
419. See Reply in Support of Motion for Reconsideration at 2–3, Jamison, 2013 WL
3872171 (No. 12-C-4415), ECF No. 111.
420. See id. at 2–5.
421. See id. at 2–7.
422. See Jamison, 2013 WL 3872171, at *8–10; supra text accompanying note 420.
423. See Jamison, 2013 WL 3872171, at *8–10.
424. See id.
425. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 379.
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that demonstrate such unconcern towards precision have enabled superfluous
litigation in the long run.426
PB Property Management presents another example.427 Like in Jamison,
the plaintiffs in PB Property Management filed a motion to certify a Rule
23(b)(3) action.428 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant, a manufacturer
of air conditioning and heating system components, knew of several defects
in its products that regularly led to leakage and necessary repairs.429 Yet,
notwithstanding this potential deception, a district court ultimately denied the
motion.430 It did so by way of acceding to the defendant’s claims regarding
the ascertainability and predominance requirements.431 Specifically, the
court held that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy both of these requirements
because the proposed class definition was substantially overbroad.432 The
court, however, did not explain why it felt that the defendant had correctly
framed the overbreadth issue in this duplicative manner.433
In its opposition to the motion for class certification, the defendant had
argued overbreadth under the ascertainability requirement.434 It noted that
the existence of a substantial number of claimants who had never been
exposed to the alleged defects mandated a denial of class certification.435 In
support of this ascertainability assertion, it cited Walewski and several other
cases.436 Next, the defendant devoted almost a dozen pages to the
predominance inquiry.437 Both arguments equally consisted of contentions
regarding the existence of the uninjured class members.438 As for the
requirement itself, the defendant asserted that “individualized inquiries”
regarding a common form of liability “overwhelm[ed] any common
questions.”439 While the word “overbroad” was not used here as it was
within the ascertainability section, the arguments remained practically
identical.440
Following these repetitious contentions, the plaintiffs responded by noting
that the defendant was “simply wrong” because whether “some members did
not experience the [alleged] problem” was no reason to deny class
426. See PB Prop. Mgmt., Inc. v. Goodman Mfg., No. 12-CV-1366-HES-JBT, 2016 WL
7666179, at *18 (M.D. Fla. May 12, 2016); Jamison v. First Credit Servs., 290 F.R.D. 92, 108
(N.D. Ill. 2013).
427. See PB Prop. Mgmt., 2016 WL 7666179, at *18–21 (showing how the court framed
its overbreadth analysis through the defendant’s analytical structure).
428. See id. at *4.
429. See id. at *2–3.
430. See id. at *29.
431. See id. at *18–20, *27–28.
432. See id.
433. See generally id.
434. See Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification at 20, PB
Prop. Mgmt., 2016 WL 7666179 (No. 12-CV-1366-HES-JBT), ECF No. 89.
435. See id.
436. See id. at 20–21.
437. See id. at 22–34.
438. See id.
439. See id. at 22.
440. See id.
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certification under the ascertainability requirement.441 Instead, they
suggested that these liability questions were best evaluated under the
predominance inquiry.442 Nevertheless, many of these assertions proved
needless as the court subsequently demonstrated its support of the
defendant’s imprecise arguments443 at the expense of succinct analysis.444
The overbreadth issue in this case and in Jamison could have been
sufficiently framed under one Rule 23 requirement.445 Because these courts
chose not to, the plaintiffs’ attorneys wasted their valuable time and the
defendants were likely exposed to unnecessary monetary costs.446
2. The Resultant Potential for Forum Shopping
As demonstrated above, these unnecessary litigation costs may lead to
forum shopping.447 To illustrate, consider that the plaintiffs in Jamison and
PB Property Management may have been unable to choose between multiple
forums for their respective Rule 23(b)(3) suits.448 If true, then these plaintiffs
were forced to litigate in courts that had demonstrated imprecise overbreadth
analysis.449 Alternatively, similarly situated plaintiffs may have been able to
select separate forums that had not previously acquiesced to defendants’
imprecise analytical structures. Thus, in this scenario, the Jamison and PB
Property Management plaintiffs would have been subjected to redundant
overbreadth litigation and unnecessary costs solely due to their inability to
forum shop.450 Conversely, the latter plaintiffs would not have been exposed
to these superfluous costs if they had chosen to forum shop in this manner.451
Accordingly, it is clear that the overbreadth issue results in inefficient and
unfair consequences for involved litigants.452 Fortunately, as Part III next
describes, a feasible solution exists: courts must consistently apply the
predominance requirement during overbreadth analysis at the class
certification stage in Rule 23(b)(3) suits.

441. See Plaintiffs’ Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Class Certification at 6–8, PB
Prop. Mgmt., Inc. v. Goodman Mfg., No. 12-CV-1366-HES-JBT, 2016 WL 7666179 (M.D.
Fla. May 12, 2016), ECF No. 107.
442. See id. (noting that this is the predominance inquiry’s ultimate question).
443. See Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification, supra note
434, at 20–24.
444. See Plaintiffs’ Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Class Certification, supra note
441, at 6–16 (showing how the plaintiffs redundantly responded to the defendant’s objections
due to the prior inconsistent holdings and analysis).
445. See supra text accompanying note 441.
446. See supra text accompanying note 402.
447. See supra text accompanying note 403.
448. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 405.
449. See supra Part II.B.1.
450. See supra text accompanying note 403.
451. See supra Part II.A.1.a.
452. See supra text accompanying notes 69–80.
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III. COURTS SHOULD CONSISTENTLY APPLY THE PREDOMINANCE
REQUIREMENT DURING OVERBREADTH ANALYSIS
AT RULE 23’S CLASS CERTIFICATION STAGE
This Note centers on an often-overlooked issue within the federal courts
and exposes its resultant detrimental consequences for litigants. A solution
is highly attainable. Consider the current circuit split on ascertainability.453
That issue implicates judicial disagreements as to the result of Rule 23 class
certification.454 Alternatively, courts unanimously agree that irreparably
overbroad classes should be denied class certification.455 Here, the issue
simply exists due to differing rationales for class certification analysis.456
Thus, due to the issue’s nature, courts have the ability to harmonize their
actions to avoid the aforementioned ineffective litigation.
To further this point, it is important to revisit the issue’s context. First,
this Note explained how Rule 23’s class certification requirements need to
be consistently applied for effectiveness.457 Then, Part II presented examples
of the overbreadth issue to show how inconsistent analysis at the class
certification stage may indeed result in unnecessary litigation costs and the
potential for forum shopping.458 In doing so, this Note displayed why courts
need to adopt one standard for overbreadth analysis irrespective of which
class certification requirement is the “correct” one.
Regardless of this general need for uniformity, the predominance inquiry
is the optimal analytical approach as each requirement under Rule 23 fulfills
distinct goals.459 The explicit predominance requirement, for example,
ensures that sufficient similarities exist between class members to ensure that
the consolidation of claims remains superior to alternate forms of
litigation.460 Of course, the hallmark of similarities between claimants is a
common form of liability—as individualized inquiries inherently do not
predominate where class members share the same injury.461 Thus, it is
apparent that overbreadth scrutiny falls neatly within the requirement’s
framework and actually encourages analytic clarity.462
In contrast, the ascertainability requirement does not truly relate to this
overbreadth concern. As stated, it simply mandates objective class
definitions so that proposed members may be identified.463 This implicit
requirement ensures that people are properly protected from potentially
duplicative litigation.464 In particular, a plaintiff’s satisfaction of this
453.
454.
455.
456.
457.
458.
459.
460.
461.
462.
463.
464.

See supra text accompanying note 174.
See supra text accompanying notes 174–78.
See supra text accompanying note 220.
See supra Part II.
See supra text accompanying note 12.
See supra text accompanying note 12.
See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 115.
See supra text accompanying note 122.
See supra text accompanying note 127.
See supra text accompanying notes 202–09, 268.
See supra text accompanying note 176.
See supra text accompanying note 163.
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requirement allows for adequate notice.465 As explained above, objectively
defined classes that are overbroad may still satisfy the requirement when all
class members remain identifiable.466 Hence, overbreadth analysis is not
within ascertainability’s scope.
Accordingly, to fix the issue, the
predominance requirement must be uniformly adopted and consistently
applied. It is also fundamental that courts appreciate the need for uniformity
when applying the FRCP.
CONCLUSION
The inconsistency of overbreadth analysis at Rule 23’s class certification
stage can be attributed to a variety of causes.467 This general inconsistency
has resulted in widespread ineffective litigation.468 And, as explained in this
Note, the Rule’s large footprint on society has only intensified such negative
ramifications. To remedy this inconsistency, courts should unanimously
apply the predominance requirement to promote the Rule’s effectiveness.
The failure to fix this issue further creates litigant uncertainty and, as
explored above, can subject parties to superfluous legal costs and
unnecessary delays at the class certification stage. These sorts of potential
problems could be avoided if courts uniformly adopt one form of analysis.
Although this issue has only a limited effect on class certification results, it
is vital to capitalize on any opportunity that helps encourage efficiency and
fairness within our legal system.

465.
466.
467.
468.

See supra text accompanying note 365.
See supra text accompanying note 260.
See supra Part II.
See supra Part II.

